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Economic Man and Literary
Woman: One Contrast
by Robin West*

The law and literature movement has been with us long enough that it
is now possible to speak seriously of a "literary analysis of law,'" just as it
has become possible, and even standard, to speak of an "economic analysis of law." It is also standard, of course, to speak of that abstract character who has emerged from the economic analysis of law: "economic man."
In these brief comments, I want to offer one contrast of the "economic
man" that emerges from economic legal analysis with the "literary person" that is beginning to emerge from literary legal analysis. I will sometimes call the latter person, in the interest of rough justice and somewhat
in the interest of accuracy, "literary woman."· The "literary woman" posited by literary legal theorists is coming into her own, and she is at least
beginning to operate as a check on the excesses of economic man run
wild.
I should add by way of caveat that these comments are intended to be
programmatic and tentative. I am not suggesting, and do not believe, that
the comparative vision of literary woman that contrasts with economic
man and which I will describe in this essay is the only, or even the most,
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland Law School. University of Maryland (B.A., 1976; J.D., 1979); Stanford Law School (J.S.M., 1982).
This paper was originally given at the University of Indiana Law and the Arts Conference,
Fall of 1986. I would like to thank Richard Weisberg, Quincie Hopkins (Maryland Law
School, Class of 1989) and Robert B. Green for comments on an early draft.
1. James Boyd White has used the phrase "literary view towards law," although in a
slightly different context and toward a somewhat different end. See White, Economics and
Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 64 TENN. L. REv. 161, 201 (1987).
2. In the interest of rough justice, I use the word "woman" to include men as well as
women, "she" to include the male pronoun, and "womankind" to include mankind. In the
interest of accuracy, women's moral voice seems to be distinctively tied to the moral value of
empathy I discuss in this paper, and the literary method of narrative. See generally C. GILLIGAN. IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Sheny, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 643 (1986).
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representative vision of humanity and human nature that has emerged
from the law and literature movement. I do think, though, that it is a
vision we ought to pursue. The idealized literary person, sometimes explicit, but most often implicit in much of our literary legal analysis,
stands in sharp contrast to her closest interdisciplinary cousin, economic
man. For that reason alone, the vision of human nature she represents
has tremendous moral promise. We ought to begin to make good on it.
I.

LITERARY WOMAN AND ECONOMIC MAN

The economic man posited by modern legal economists {and to a lesser
degree by liberal legalists> is a relatively complex figure. I want to focus
here on only two of his major attributes, both of which sharply distinguish him from literary woman. First, economic man is an infallible "rational maximizer of his own utility."s This attribute subdivides into two
subparts, one "cognitive" and the other "motivational": economic man
invariably knows what is best for himself;' and he inevitably is motivated
to seek it. ~ He knows his own subjective welfare perfectly and pursues it
relentlessly. He is the infallible judge, for example, of whether he "would
prefer" pushpin to poetry, alcohol to nutrition, or heroin to shelter. He
knows best not only whether a Coke or a Pepsi would yield him greater
pleasure, but also whether a liberal education or an apprenticeship would
better prepare him for life. His preferences perfectly mirror his subjective
welfare, and his choices perfectly mirror his preferences. Thus, he relentlessly chooses what he prefers, prefers what he wants, wants what he
desires, and desires what will maximize his subjective well-being. He is
3. Thus, Posner claims in the introduction to THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE:
[The tool of law and economics1 is the assumption that people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions . . . . Is it plausible to suppose that people are rational only or mainly when they are transacting in markets, and not when they are
engaged in other activities of life, such as marriage and litigation and crime and
discrimination and concealment of personal information? ... I happen to find
implausible and counterintuitive the view that the individual . . . will act rationally in making some trivial purchase but irrationally when deciding whether to go
to law school or get married or evade income taxes or have three children rather
than two or prosecute a lawsuit.
R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 1-2 (1981).
4. This assertion sometimes takes the tautological form that the individual's preferences
are definitionally what is best for her or him, and sometimes take the more substantive form
that the individual has superior access to the sorts of knowledge required to make the judgment of what is best. The view is concisely criticized in Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979
WISC. L. REV. 769 (1979).
5. This assumption was the target of my essay, West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice,

the Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985).
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perfectly rational.
The second distinguishing attribute of economic man is what I call his
"empathic impotence." Although economic man is perfectly rational with
respect to knowledge of his own subjective well-being, he is at the same
time utterly incapable of empathic knowledge regarding the subjective
well-being of others.' He is unable, in economic terms, to "compare" the
"relative intensity" of the subjective pain of another with either his own
pain or with that of others." Although the technical, jargonistic language
of the law and economics movement hides the point, the economist's insistence that economic man is unable to make "intersubjective comparisons of utility," when translated into common parlance, amounts to no
more than an admission (rather than an assertion) that economic man
lacks even minimal empathic skills. Economic man is peculiarly incapable
of the empathic knowledge, quite common to the rest of us, that his
neighbor's broken leg hurts more than his own hangnail;8 or that a child's
discomfort while eating a healthy diet is less than the pain she will feel if
she eats nothing but sugar; or that the pain an impoverished buyer might
sustain when the law deprives him of the' freedom to contract to purchase
a television set on burdensome credit terms is less than the pain that
buyer would sustain in the future when he loses essentials such as food
and clothing he would otherwise be able to purchase.' He cannot empathize with the other sufficiently to make these comparisons.
Thus, one way-surely not the only way-to describe economic man is
that he is both peculiarly capable and peculiarly disabled: he knows
everything there is to know about his own subjective life, and nothing
whatsoever about the subjective lives of others. He is as incapable of error
regarding his own subjective self interest as he is incapable of knowledge
regarding the subjectivity of others. Empathy is as foreign to him as ra6. See generally L. ROBBINS, AN ESSAY OF THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC
SCIENCE (1935). The modern claim that we cannot compare interpersonal utilities constitutes a significant departure from the classical utilitarian position that such knowledge is
both possible, and the basis of utility summations across persons. The modern economist's
insistence that we are incapable of knowing anything whatsoever about the internal states of
others seems to be driven primarily by the quest for objectivity and quantification. The view
has been heavily criticized in both the philosophical and legal literature. See, e.g., J. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 90-92 (1971); B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980); Kelman, supra note 4, at 778-79.
7. See generally, Kelman, supra note 4, at 778-79 and the authorities cited therein.
8. Id.
9. Economic attacks on judicial interference with consumer preferences in the private
market on the basis of unconscionability and voter preferences in the public sphere on the
basis of unconstitutionality are typically premised either in whole or in part on this assumption. See, e.g., Epstein, Unconscionability; A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & ECON. 293
(1975); and Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971).
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tionality is familiar. Economic man is, in short, a rational, self-regarding
Hercules, and an empathic, other-regarding weakling.
Now, as I and countless other critics of the law and economics movement have argued elsewhere, the first of the economist's assumptions regarding our nature-the Herculean rationalism of economic man-is almost surely false. 10 We are not invariably rational maximizers of our
utility in either the cognitive or motivational sense: we do not always
know what is best for ourselves, and we are not invariably motivated to
seek it. I will not repeat these debates here. I do want to note, however,
that, although we should not need literature, law, or a movement to tell
us this simple truth, it is nevertheless one of the abiding strengths of the'
law and literature movement, as well as of literature more generally, that
the "literary person" assumed by literary critical theory has helped us see
this.ll While reading narrative literature, a reader recognizes dimensions
of a character's subjectivity to which the character himself is blind and
constantly discovers dimensions of her own character as well, of which
she was previously unaware. As Gadamer rightly insists, we "discover ourselves" as we engage in dialogue with texts, and part of what we discover
in the text as well as in ourselves are wants, needs, prejudices, desires,
and even "preferences" which we did not know we had, and for which we
have no plausible explanation, so long as we focus narrowly on our "individualist" histories!· This process of self-discovery would be literally
meaningless if we were as knowledgeable of our subjectivity as is economic man. But we simply are not; we remain a mystery to ourselves
throughout adulthood, not just in our early years of "minority." Indeed,
for most of us, culture has the great value it has, in large part, because it
is the means by which we learn who we are.13 Put simply, we just do not
know ourselves as well as economic lawyers insist. Literature is one means
by which we can glimpse this truth.
Nor are our motivations relentlessly rational, as countless critics of the
10. See, e.g., West, supra note 5; Kelman, supra note 4.
11. Even those critics of the law and economics movement who do not identify themselves as literary-legal theorists rely heavily on the notion that a narrative view of personal
identity is radically opposed to the economist's discrete, moment-by-moment vision of what
it means to be a human "chooser." Mark Kelman, more clearly than any other, has made
this assumption explicit. It certainly is not merely a coincidence that he is also a novelist.
See Kelman, supra note 4; Kelman. The Past and Future of Legal Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 432. 436 (1983); Kelman, Spitzer and Hoffman on Case: A Brief Rejoinder. 53 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1215, 1215. 1221 (1980).
12. See generally GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS. On the Problem of Self-Understanding (1976).
13. For the clearest statement from James White, a seminal literary theorist, of the
shortcomings of the economic model of motivation and self-knowledge, see White. supra
note 1, at 173, 180-81, 191-94.
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law and economics movement have also argued. Again, although we
should not need literature to tell us this obvious fact, the sharply contrasting vision of human nature offered by the law and literature movement surely has helped us see it.14 In fact, literary woman has the potential to correct a misimpression created by the nonliterary critical attacks
on economic man as well. Critical-legal-studies critiques of economic man
often proceed on the unnecessarily limiting assumption that while we are
not motivationally unidimensional as the economists insist, we are "dualmotivational"; that is, we possess altruistic, other-focused communitarian
needs and desires as well as egotistic, self-serving, individualistic desires.
The complexity of literary woman reminds us, however, that this too is a
false duality. We have many kinds of needs, desires, and motivations, not
just one as the legal economists insist, and not just two as their communitarian critics sometimes imply. Unlike economic man, literary woman is
indeed at times altruistic, as the communitarian critics of economic man
insist, but she is also at times masochistic, automatic, submissive, selfish,
oppressive, and perhaps sadistic. IG Indeed, we have literature in large part
because our characters are multidimensional and worth exploring. Their
complexity is a constant surprise, both to ourselves and to others.
In short, the literary woman emerging from our literary analysis of law
is no Herculean rationalist. Her character is multimotivational, which is
why it is worth exploring, and she does not know herself-her own subjectivity-as well as she might. She is sufficiently complex so that as a
character, she is worth portraying, and as a reader, she is worthy of dialogue; she is educable.
We can sharpen the contrast between economic man and literary woman even further, however, by focusing on economic man's second distinguishing attribute. Although not as frequently controverted, the second of
the economist's assumptions-that we are incapable of making "interpersonal comparisons of utility"-is also almost surely false. Ie The ability to
make "interpersonal comparisons of utility" is, in simpler language, the
ability to empathize with the pains and pleasures, the joys and sorrows,
and the happiness and suffering of others. The claim that we are incapable of making such comparisons is simply the claim that we are utterly
nonempathic. 17 If we cannot "intersubjectively compare" utility, we can14.

[d.

15. See West. supra note 5.
16. See Kelman, supra note 4 for the related argument that knowledge we undoubtedly
possess regarding the categorization of goods belies the claim that we cannot know anything
about the nature of the consumer, but only about the objective processes of the chooser.
17. I have explored the connection between the capacity for empathy and the economist's assertion that we are incapable of interpersonal comparisons elsewhere. See West,
Taking Preferences Seriously (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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not "know" the joys and sorrows of our neighbor, our friends, our
spouses, our co-contractors, our co-litigants, our families, our co-workers,
our employees, our lovers, or our community. But the economist's claim
here is surely incorrect. We can and routinely do make intersubjective
comparisons of utility.18 We can know the subjective lives of our neighbors, both those who are close to us and those who are not. We are not
"incapable" of this knowledge. Indeed, the capacity for this knowledge is
a large part of what makes us human. III The sharply contrasting vision of
human nature embodied in literary woman provides a means (one means)
by which we can understand this truth. Through reading, hearing, and
telling stories, we do precisely what economic legal analysis insists we are
incapable of doing. We reach an empathic understanding-a grasping-of
the subjectivity, the pain, the pleasure, the happiness, or the sadness of
the other. When we read with understanding, we not only understand
that happiness or pain, but to some degree we take it on as our own.
Literary woman then, unlike economic man, may not be a Herculean
rationalist, but nor is she an empathic weakling: she is fully able to
make intersubjective comparisons of utility. Empathic ability is the very
competence that is assumed-that must be assumed-by both writer and
reader if narrative communication is to be meaningful. Indeed, the idealized literary person posited by literary legal theorists is distinctively capable in just this way-the literary person has a virtually infinite empathic potential. lo She has a virtually infinite ability to understand the
subjective being of the other, even where such empathic knowledge is
most difficult: of the person with the different racial heritage, the different family history, the different intelligence, or the different ambitions,
goals, happiness, and sorrow.11 The primary attribute of the idealized literary person is her intersubjective empathic competence. Thus, while literary woman may be rationally inept, her empathic ability is truly Herculean. It is literary woman's empathic competence, which is not shared by
economic man, that constitutes her moral promise. It is to that promise,
18. See the authorities cited in supra note 6.
19. For a persuasive and eloquent argument to this effect, see Henderson, Legality and
Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987).
20. On the centrality of narratiVe to empathic ability, see Henderson, supra note 19;
Kelman, supra notes 4 & 11; Sherry, supra note 2; Gilligan, supra note 2. For a related
argument to the effect that narrative and the capacity for storytelling are central to moral
virtue, see McINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1980).
21. Examples, of course, are endless, but two must be mentioned. In BELOVED, Toni
Morrison provides a striking-as well as strikingly accessible-description of the internal
subjectivity of escaped slaves in precivil war days. In (I think) equally stunning literary style
and language, law professor Patricia Williams has provided invaluable descriptions of the
internal subjectivity of modern people of color. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing
Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 401 (1987).
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and how we might fulfill it, to which I now wish to turn.
II.

THE MORAL PROMISE OF THE LITERARY PERSON

That the "intersubjective comparison of utility," or, in short, empathy,
is possible, does not imply that it is easy. In some cases, empatmy is easy.
We can easily compare the pain of a pinprick with the pain of a dislocated shoulder.11 But it is a tremendous mistake to conclude, as many
critics of economic man do too quickly, that because interpersonal comparisons are obviously possible in many cases, that they are therefore
straightforward and simple in all cases. In many cases, and probably in
those cases in which it matters most, intersubjective comparisons of utility are profoundly difficult. In those cases in which empathic understanding is most urgently needed, it is hardest to achieve. Empathy is hard
when the experience with which we are trying to empathize is one that we
never have experienced ourselves, and even one that we never could experience ourselves. IS Empathy is hard when the personality with which we
are trying to empathize, the subjectivity we are trying to grasp, is radically different from our own.I " It is very difficult, for example, for a member of the racial majority in this country to empathize with the subjective
pain of living in a racist society. I suspect that most of us who think we
do understand this pain in fact do not. 1111 It is very difficult for a heterosexual to understand the magnitude of the pain experienced by a homosexual living in a homophobic society!- To take a more local issue, it is
very difficult for a white man to empathically grasp the magnitude or nature of the pain of being the only woman or black on a law faculty. I? It is
not impossible, but it is difficult. It is difficult to empathize with the pain
of those who are most different from us.
Now, the way that the literary woman achieves the empathic bridge in
22. lowe this example to Mark Kelman. See Kelman, supra note 4, at 780.
23. The adamant refusal of the "white male heavies" in the critical legal studies move·
ment (as elsewhere) to come to grips with this deceptively simple point is the reason, plain
and simple, that so many women, people of color, gays, lesbians, and other "different" and
differently oppressed groups are enraged by the internal dynamics of the movement.
24. See generally Henderson, Legality and Empathy, supra note 19: Minow, Foreword:
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987).
25. Legal theorists, litigators, and judges of color have always, of course, understood this,
but recently legal academics have begun to respond to the problem with greater use of metaphor, narrative, remembrance, anecdote, and even fantasy. See, e.g., Williams, supra note
21: D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
26.. For a powerful description, see Mohr, AIDS, Gay Life, State Coercion, 6 RARITAN 38
(1986). Henderson argues that the refusal to even attempt empathic Identification with gay
men accounts for the disastrous outcome in Bowers v. Hardwick. Henderson, supra note 19.
27. See D. BELL, supra note 25.
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the hard case, the means by which she gains access to the other's subjective life, is metaphor and narrative. This is the one vital lesson that the
literary person, and hence the literary analysis of law, can uniquely teach
us: she can teach us how to empathize in the hard case. It is for this
teaching that the law and literature movement is singularly significant.
For like tHe metaphor, narrative literature, when it is good, is the bridge
that facilitates empathic understanding, and the literary person knows
this. 18 Metaphor and narrative are the means by which we come to understand what was initially foreign. Narrative is the communication that facilitates the profoundly difficult "intersubjective comparison of utility"
when more ordinary means fail. In political contexts, we rely on metaphor
when our differences leave us desperate, when nothing else works and we
have no other choice. "It was as though a curtain had dropped on my selfhood," Martin Luther King stated, describing the pain of segregation.II'
We might translate King's utterance in this way: "It is unlike anything
you have ever experienced, so I will try a metaphor." And the metaphor is
a good one. The white listener comes slightly closer to understanding a
black man's pain, to grasping it, to seeing it, to feeling it, and most important, to assuming it as her own. Like all good metaphors, this one
helps us understand the inexplicable. It helps us see what is hidden. By
virtue of doing so, it helps us grow.
Surely, by now, it is no secret that as a culture we are in danger of
losing the humanistic perspective that cultural traditionalism in general,
and literature in particular, has to offer. As lawyers, we should be particularly wary of the serious risk this danger entails. If we as lawyers lose the
literary voice, the literary insight, the literary vision of our humanity, if
we lose the law and literature movement, we will have lost an important
and even vital interdisciplinary and critical perspective on law. But there
is something greater at stake, I believe, than the loss of a critical perspective. If we let go of our literary self in our relentless quest for technocratic
efficiency and bureaucratic competence, we all-lawyers and nonlawyers
alike-risk losing our ability to build a community. For although it is
surely possible, both in practice and in theory, to make interpersonal
comparisons of utility, it is also surely possible that we can become incapable of making them, particularly in those hard cases when it matters
most. Although we are today "empathically competent," that can surely
change. We can surely become the person posited as economic man. We
28. This is, for example, a constant theme, perhaps the only constant theme, in James
Boyd White's writing, from THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1972) through WHEN WORDS LOSE
THEIR MEANING (1984). I don't know any other legal theorist who has said this as otten, or
as eloquently. See also Henderson, supra note 19; Minow, supra note 24.
29. Quoted in S. Oates, LET THE TRUMPETS SOUND, THE LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
15 (1982).
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can become unable to make intersubjective comparisons of utility. We
can become incapable of empathy. We can become hardened to others.
We can surely become unable to listen to, understand, or respond sympathetically to the subjective anguish of others. But we do not have to, and
the insistence that we do not have to and that we ought not to is the
central, unique, and irreplaceable contribution of the law and literature
movement. We can fulfill the empathic promise of the literary person
rather than the egotistic danger of economic man. We can become more
capable, not less capable, of intersubjectively comparing utilities. We can
become more, not less, empathic; more, not less, able to understand the
subjective lives of others who are radically different from us and respond
sympathetically to those lives. We do so, in part, by reading and appreciating the narrative stories of the lives of others.
In closing, let me give an example of the type of question a narrative or
literary perspective can help us answer. How does it feel, subjectively, to
be an adult incest survivor, or, more broadly, a survivor of childhood sexual abuse? How much lingering physical, psychic, emotional and moral
pain is involved? How bad is the pain? How does the "intensity" compare
with other pains? What are the implications for adult life? How does it
affect one's integrity? How does it affect one's sense of self? Does it damage one's capacity to tell the truth? Does it preclude adult trust, in either
oneself or others? Obviously, these are questions regarding the subjectivity of the other, and they are questions for which, as lawye~s, we need
answers. If for no other reason, the legislator needs to know how much of
our collective resources to expend on the problem of sexual abuse of children. We need to know, and presently we do not, how serious the crime
is, and how grave the injury, occasioned by the apparently widespread
sexual abuse of our children. To answer that question, we need to understand the subjectivity of the abused.
In connection with work I have been doing on the relationship between
heterosexuality and violence, in the past two years I have read many narrative accounts of incest and sexual child abuse, and I still do not know
the answers to these questions. But what my reading has taught me is
that the answers to these questions are, in principle, knowable. I am now
convinced that even those of us who have never had this crushing experience can empathize to some extent with those who have. I do not know
whether the nonabused majority can ever fully understand the "relative
intensity" of that abiding and utterly internal and subjective pain, or of
the damage that lingers into adulthood, or of the sorrow that grows from
a profound trust having been demolished, or of the sense of loss arising
from a security that should be an entitlement of childhood forever being
destroyed. I am not sure we can perfectly assess the "intensity of this
disutility," or compare its intensity with others. But with metaphor and
narrative, when all else fails, we try. With metaphor, narrative, and a will-
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ingness to listen, we can succeed to some extent.
Let my try to prove the point. In a remarkably powerful account of her
survival of childhood abuse, contained in an equally remarkable book,30
Lillian Kelly uses both metaphor and narrative to communicate the intensity of her experience of both abuse and survival. She begins with a
metaphor to communicate the intensity of the abuse: "Aside from the
fear, confusion, and shame, the molestation was as if I'd passed through
an enormous threshold, as big as birth."81 She then uses an allegory to
convey the intensity of the aftermath.
Some years after (its always "before" and "after," isn't it?), during my
senior year of high school, my close friend received two antique vases in
the mail. One arrived whole, the other hopelessly shattered. My friend
labored, sometimes passionately, sometimes indifferently, all through
that year piecing together the delicate porcelain. When her cat knocked
the half-completed reconstruction from her desk, breaking it in new
places, I think my friend saw it as a minor and interesting setback, while
I despaired.
She completed the project, but the vase she produced could hardly be
called complete. Tiny and large chips, once part of the original, had inevitably been lost, hidden in the packing material, or carried away by a
little sister. This vase was more a product of my friend's labor than that
of the original artist. Strangely, though, the new vase, for all its disfigurement, scars, chips, and ragged lip, for alI the horror of the shattering and
an imperfect mending, when set beside its unblemished twin, was the
more splendid of the two. My friend presented her vase to me as a graduation gift, and I have it still.as

Although entirely metaphorical, or perhaps because it is entirely metaphorical, this description, better than most I have read, communicates
powerfully both the comparative intensity of the pain of abuse and the
subjective experience of survival. Both the injured child and the heroic,
courageous adult that emerges from this short account become members
of my community, a part of my sense of self. Because she shared her
story, her injury has become my injury, my burden, and part of my responsibility, and her heroism has become part of my human potentiality.
I understand, better than before, the magnitude of her pain and the momentousness of her strength.
The knowledge we learn in this way-knowledge of the subjectivity of
others, gained and pursued through metaphor, allegory, narrative, literature, and culture-is a peculiar sort of knowledge, but it is absolutely
30. I NEVER TOLD ANYONE: WRITINGS
Bass & L. Thornton, eds. 1983).
31. ld. at 197.
32. ld.

BY WOMEN SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
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essential to any meaningful quest for justice, legal or otherwise. It is the
knowledge that facilitates community, and the capacity for that knowledge is the capacity that makes us social. Without it, we would not crave,
much less attain, justice. But it is not rational knowledge. Knowledge of
the other's subjectivity is not rationally acquired, and it cannot be rationally calculated, quantified, aggregated. or compared. It is knowledge that
moves us rather than informs us. We "make room" for this knowledge in
our heart, not in our head. Knowledge of others, empathically acquired
through metaphor and narrative, is knowledge that becomes a part of our
sense of self, our sense of the other, and our sense of union with him.
Without knowledge of this sort, we cannot attain true community, and
without true community we cannot attain any meaningful justice.
Martin Luther King unknowingly underscored the centrality of narrative and literature (as well· as their close cousins, demonstrations and
street theatre) to moral progress when he expli9itly ties empathy to justice in this passage:
In this final analysis the white man cannot ignore the Negro's problem,
because he is a part of the Negro and the Negro is a part of him. The
Negro's agony diminishes the white man, and the Negro's salvation enlarges the white man.
What is needed today on the part of white America is a committed
altruism which recognizes this truth. True altruism is more than the capacity to pity; it is the capacity to empathize. Pity is feeling sorry for
someone; empathy is feeling sorry with someone. Empathy is fellow feeling for the person in need-his pain, agony, and burdens. I doubt if the
problems of our teeming ghettos will have a great chance to be solved
until the white majority, through genuine empathy, comes to feel the
ache and anguish of the Negroes' daily life. aa

III.

CONCLUSION

Why, then, should lawyers read literature? Why teach this stUff? What
does it add to the legal curriculum? As Richard Posner asks, why use
fiction to make a point which could be proved, or disproved, with the
empirical tools of social science?S4 Answers to these and related questions
presently proliferate, surely masking (but never very well) endemic and
massive insecurity over the utility of humanistic discourse to legal education. This may be because we have overlooked what is most central. Perhaps the most important use of literature, for lawyers, is the most obvious
one, but the least mentioned in modem discussion of the law and literature movement. Literature helps us understand others. Literature helps
33. THE WORDS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 22 (C. King ed. 1983).
34. R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (forthcoming, Harvard Press).
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us sympathize with their pain, it helps us share their sorrow, and it helps
us celebrate their joy. It makes us more moral. It makes us better people.
The literary person, like economic man, is surely only one of the many
persons we might become. But, unlike economic man, she is also someone
we can unabashedly claim that we should become. She represents not just
our cultural heritage, but more importantly (and relatedly) she represents
our potential for moral growth. 311 She is the possibility within all of us for
understanding, for. empathy, for sympathy, and most simply, for love.

35. See generally J.

GARDNER. ON MORAL FICTION

(1976).
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